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STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE
UTAH CODE SECTION 61-1-22(1) (a) and (b)
Section 61-1-22 (1) (a) and (b) is set forth in its
entirety on page 9 herein.
UTAH CODE SECTION 61-1-3(1)
It is unlawful for any person to transact business
in this state as a broker-dealer or agent unless he
is registered under this chapter.
UTAH CODE SECTION 61-1-13(15)(a) and (5)
(a) "sale" or "sell" includes every contract for
sale of, contract to sell, or disposition of, a
security or interest in a security for value.
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AV

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Plaintiff Kent L. Walton brought this action under the
Utah State Securities Laws (Utah Code Section 61-1-1 et. seq.)
seeking to recover $15,000 that he invested in Vasilacopulos and
Associates.

Following a jury trial before the Honorable Douglas

L. Cornaby in the Second Judicial District Court, Davis County
the jury returned a set of Special Interrogatories finding that
"the Vasilacopulos and Associates Interest" purchased by Mr. Walton
was a security, (TR. 418-419) but finding that R. C. Tolman did
not sell a Vasilacopulos and Associates interest to Kent L. Walton
for $lf000 on October 7, 1981 or for $14,000 on November 5f 1981
(TR. 419). Accordingly, judgment was entered for the Defendant.
Prior to the time that the Court instructed the jury, the
Plaintiff submitted two proposed jury instructions dealing with the
meaning of the word "sell".
i

Those instructions were denied.
'

•

•

'

•

Those
'

instructions stated: ;
"You are instructed that under Utah State Securities
Law that "sell" is defined to include contracts for sale
of, contract to sell or disposition of a security or
interest in a security for value."
Source:
!
1. Utah Code Annotated 61-1-13(15) (a)
The Court then instructed the jury, over the Plaintiff's
objection (TR. 414 and 415) that:
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"You are instructed that in order to find R. C.
Tolman "sold" any security to Walton you must find that
his conduct was the proximate cause of any sale, that is,
his conduct and participation was a substantial factor
in bringing about any actual purchase and sell transaction,
(see Jury Instruction No. 18) (Emphasis Added)
The proximate cause of an event is that cause which,
in natural and continuous sequence, produces the event.
It is the efficient cause-—the one that necessarily sets
; in operation the factors that acconplish the event. (see
Jury Instruction No. 19) (Emphasis Added)
You are instructed that R. C. Tolman cannot be held
legally responsible fpr Walton's losses from his purchases
of the investments in question if Tolman merely participated in the purchase and sale transactions as an agent of
Vasilacopulos without actually "selling" the investments
to Walton as that term has been defined for you in these
instructions. (see Jury Instructions No. 22) (Emphasis
Added).
B.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT

THE JURY AS TO THE MEANING OF "SELL" PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 61-1-13(15)
1.

;^

.;,/

MATTERS ADMITTED BY DEFENDANT AT TRIAL.

In order for the Court to evaluate the Plaintiff's arguments
it is necessary for the Court to understand additional facts.
During the course of the trial Mr. Tolman testified as to his
involvement with Vasilacopulos and Associates and with the Plaintiff,
Kent L. Walton.

The following facts are drawn exclusively from the

testimony of R. C. Tolman unless it is otherwise indicated.
During 1981, R. C. Tolman served as a Salesman for Vasilacopulos
and Associates (TR. 3). In that capacity Tolman received a commission of 10% of the Vasilacopulos and Associates interests that he
sold.

(TR. 4 ) , Investors were told that under the Vasilacopulos

and Associates plan, an individual would invest money in Vasilacopulos and Associates.

That money would be taken by Mr. Jon

Vasilacopulos,tfhowould purchase large quantities of diamonds at
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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wholesale prices (TR. 21). Thereafter those diamonds would be
resold and the profit paid to the Investors (TR 22)

after about

four weeks time (TR. 10). The return on that investment was reported to be approximately 30% per month (TR. 9 ) . If the investors
desired, they could hold diamonds as collateral or security for
their investment (TR. 10 f 19f 327). Very few of the investors
actually took the diamonds (TR. 89).
On August 14, 1981, Tolman opened an office of Vasilacopulos
& Associates in Centerville, Utah (TR. 3 ) . That office was located
in the office of

R. C. Tolman Construction, Inc.

(TR. 4) and Mr.

Tolman was the manager of that office (TR. 4 and 6) and a full time
employee for Vasilacopulos (TR. 78,79).

Tolman was the only

salesman for Vasilacopulos & Associates located at the Centerville
Office (TR. 6 ) . In August 1981, Mr. Tolman hired Lana Townsend as
a secretary.

Ms. Townsend was paid by checks drawn on the account

of R. C. Tolman Construction, Inc.

(TR. 80, 133) but worked

solely for Vasilacopulos & Associates (TR. 81)
From August 14, 1981 until Novemeber 6, 1981 approximately
1100 people (TR. 78) invested 2 million dollars in Vasilacopulos &
Associates through the office of R. C. Tolman Construction (TR. 386).
Each week the Centerville office received between $100,000 and 300,000
from investors (TR. 91). Mr. Tolman received or was entitled to
receive a 10% sales commission on the entire sum,

(TR. 138) and

all that money came through Tolman (TR. 76). During that period
of time Mr. Tolman controlled the Centerville office's books
(TR. 127) and bank accounts (TR. 62).
From August 1981 through October 1981, Jon Vasilacopulos made
withdrawals from the Centerville account (TR. 63). Prior to October
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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6, 1981, M4. Vasilacopulos had withdrawn 1.5 million dollars from
the Centerville office bank account without returning any funds to
the Centerville office (TR. 384). Tolman knew that fact when he first
met with Walton but did not i'nform him of that fact (TR. 385) .

Prior

to November 5, 1981, Vasilacopulos had withdrawn approximately
$1,854,000.00 from the Centerville office bank accounts (TR. 386).
Mr. Tolman knew this fact (TR. 391) since he had established a
system to monitor Mr. Vasilacopulos1 withdrawals from the Centerville
bank accounts (TR. 63 and TR. 391).
Vasilacopulos never returned a single penny to the Centerville
account (TR. 63, 75) despite the fact that the Vasilacopulos plan
called for diamonds to be bought and sold every four weeks (TR. 389).
The fact that Vasilacopulos never returned any profits concerned
Tolman (TR. 389) but despite the fact that the Centerville office's
bank account had become depleted by Vasilacopulos1 withdrawals
(TR. 390) Mr. Tolman did not tell those who invested after the
end of October 1981, that the bank account of the Centerville
office of Vasilacopulos & Associates was empty (TR. 390).
Tolman first met with the Plaintiff, Kent L. Walton on
October 6, 1981.

At that meeting Tolman explained the "Vasilacopulos

plan" to Walton.

(TR. 65, 77). Tolman told Walton that the venture

"should be looked upon as high risk" (TR. 65, 66). This was the
same thing that Tolman told all investors (TR. 77) (See also
testimony of Kent L. Walton) (TR. 203-206).

According to Mr. Walton,

Tolman told him that he would receive 30% per month (TR. 204)
(Compare with Tolman testimony at TR 9 ) . Tolman also informed Walton
that an investor could "hold diamonds" to cover his investment.
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(TR. 205). Thereafter, on October 7, 1981, Walton delivered a
cashiers check to Tolman in the sum of $1,000 (Tolman, TR. 72-77)
and Tolman delivered a receipt to Walton, personally signed and
prepared by Tolman, for that $1,000 (TR. 77, 78 and Plaintiff's
Exhibit No. 2 ) . Thereafter, on November 5, 1981, Walton delivered
a check in the sum of $14,000 to Centerville office (TR. 83, 84)
During the period of time between late September 1981, and
the end of October 1981, Vasilacopulos & Associates collapsed
(see generally TR. 34-55).

In late September 1981, Tolman attempted

to purchase "collateral" diamonds from United Investment Reserve
in California (TR 34).

(These diamonds were to be held by the

investors to protect their investment (TR. 28-30)).

The

"collateral"

diamonds were different than the diamonds that were allegedly purchased and sold by Vasilacopulos to generate a profit (TR. 23).
United Investment however, refused to ship Tolman any diamonds
even though Tolman had wired United Investment $300,000 for those
diamonds since Vasilacopulos & Associates stilled owed United
Investment at least $300,000 from a previous purchase.

(TR. 34-37)

Mr. Tolman was aware of that fact (TR. 37) .
On October 23, 1981, Tolman paid out the last of the funds in
the Centerville account (TR. 132-134).

On October 24, 1981, the

Deseret News published an article alleging that the price of diamonds had dropped drastically and that it was impossible for people
to make 30% per month on a commodity that had been dropping for a
year.

(See TR. 30, 43 and Plaintifffs Exhibit No. 6)

The article

also implied that the diamond investment plan was a "ponzi scheme"
(See Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 9 ) . In connection with the last
-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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allegation it is interesting to note the manner in which Tolman
ran the Centerville bank account.

(TR. 91). Tolman read that

article (TR. 58). Following the publication of the article many of
Vasilacopulos1 investors requested the return of their money.
Because the funds had been depleted a high number of investorsf
perhaps as many as 150 investors, did not receive any return of
their investment.

(TR. 51)

At that time investors were coming

into the Centerville office every day asking for the return of their
money (TR. 53), none of the investors were paid their money in
November of 1981 (TR. 51). Thereafter, on November 2, 1981f Tolman
refused to allow any new investors to invest in Vasilacopulos &
Associates (TR. 64) because the office was out of diamonds and
funds (TR. 65). Prior to that time Tolman had been "hounding"
Vasilacopulos to get him additional funds and diamonds (TR. 65).
Thereafter, on November 5, 1981, Kent Walton delivered a check in
the sum of $14,000 to the Centerville office (TR. 83, 84 and
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 4 ) . That deposit was made late in the
afternoon of November 5, 1981 (Walton, TR. 209).
of November 1981, Tolman received $38,200.

In the first week

(TR. 401). All of that

money came from previous investors (TR. 4 02).

At least some of that

money went to pay R. C. Tolman the commissions for the Vasilacopulos
sales (TR. 93, 94). The November commission may have been in
excess of $30,000 (TR. 94). In all Tolman, his wife and company were
paid the sum of $201,847.00 by Vasilacopulos & Associates (TR. 409).
That sum represents $63,419.00 above any investment made by Tolman
in Vasilacopulos & Associates (TR. 413) or an

annual commission in

excess of $243,000.00.
During the last few weeks in October 1981, Tolman became very
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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concerned about the financial condition of Vasilacopulos & Associates.

On

October 28, 1981, Tolman wrote to Vasilacopulos as

follows:
Dear Jon,
Enclosed find the article by Deseret News dated
October 24, 1981. The article is having a bad effect
on the Centerville bank account; it is overdrawn at
the present. The $250,000 you withdrew from the account
on October 8, 1981 and the $200,000 you withdrew on
October 15, 1981 has left this office without funds
to operate on. I have kept very good records of what
is owed your diamond purchasers, but the effect of the
said article is causing may of the diamond purchasers
to want their money back.
:
I am requesting money from you on the diamond sales
as our funds are depleted. Money is needed to pay the
returns to the many people who are demanding their cash
returned at this time. I have not received any monies to
pay what is needed. I am having to make excuses to the
people which is causing me personal discomfort. I am
puzzled as to what the delay would be. If there is a
problem with funding or selling the diamonds I need to
know. Otherwise, I have nothing to tell them and they are
suspecting the worst.
I am only a commissioned salesman for your organization and I am on the firing line with the diamond
purchasers. Please let me know immediately if what they
suspect is true.
Sincerely,
R. C. Tolman
See P l a i n t i f f ' s

E x h i b i t No. 7 .

The n e x t day

(OiUobtvt; 2 l ),

! (>0 1 ) ,

Tolman wrote to Vasilacopulos as follows:
Dear Jon,
I have worked for your organization since January
1981. We have been very successful in obtaining a large
number of diamond buyers. My arrangement with you was to
receive 10% commission on all new accounts. I have kept
a good account of all the prople and their deposits. I
have not been able to keep current on my earned commissions because of lack of funds. I have approximately
$70,000 commissions due me. I was able to deduct small
amounts of my commission from the Vasilacopulos and
Assoc. account from time to time, but because of the
present drain on funds I am concerned about being paid
all I am owedT It is important to me to be more current
and up-to-date with the commissions. I have requested
more current funds, but none are forthcoming. I cannot
-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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get in touch with you by phone, so I have written this
letter. Please help me out!
Sincerely,
R. C. Tolman.
See Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 7.
Concerning the last week of October 1981, and the first week
of November 1981, Mr. Tolman Testified:
Q. So actually the money ran out on October 23rd,
didn't it?
A. Well, These —
Q. Not money that came in subsequent. But the money *
that was in the account prior to that was gone on October
23rd, wasn't it?
A. No, it wasn't all gone. There was deposits that
were put into the account after that date.
Q. There were new deposits?
A. Yes.
Q. But the money that had been in the account was
depleted, taken to pay off the investors on October 23rd,
wasn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, you said you just bit the bullet after this
and informed people that the funds were not available.
Did you tell them the money was gone; the bank account was
empty?
A. That is what it means when you don't have any funds.
Q. And the people you told this to were the people
that wanted their money?
A. Yes.
Q. How about the people that were going to pay in
money; did you tell them as well?
A. The people that I paid money?
Q. That are paying in the money to Vasilacopulos &
Associates; did you say the bank account is empty?
A. No.
Q. Or as of October 23rd, 1981, we paid the last of the
money out we had at that time?
A. No, I didn't tell them. (TR. 133, 134)
At trial the Defendant stipulated that neither he nor his
company registered as an agent or in any other capacity with the
Utah Satate Securities Commission.

(TR. 73). At trial the Defen-

dant did not offer any proof that the Vasilacopulos & Associates
security was exempt from registration.

Indeed, Tolman testified
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flKOUJn^rv (
that he did not know whether or not the Vasilacopulos interest was
exempt from registration (TR. 73).
2.

UTAH STATUTORY LAW

Section 61-1-22(1) and (2) of the Utah Code states:
(1) Any person who:
(a) Offers or sells a security in violation of subsection 61-1-3 (1) f section 61-1-7 or subsction 61-1-17(2)
or of any rule or order under section 61-1-15 which requires
the affirmative approval of sales literature before it is
usedf or of any condition imposed under subsection 61-1-10(4)
or 61-1-11(7); or
(b) Offers f sells, or purchases a security by means
of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements madef in the light of the circumstances
under which they are made, not misleading, the buyer not
knowing of the untruth or ommission, and who does not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the
untruth or ommision, is liable to the person selling the
security to or buying the security from him, who may sue
either at law or in equity to recover the consideration
paid for the security, together with interest at 12% per
year from the date of payment, costs, and reasonable
attorney's fees, less the amount of any income received
on the security, upon the tender of the security or for
damages if he no longer owns the security. Damages are
the amount that would be recoverable upon the tender less
the value of the security when the buyer disposed of it and
interest at 12% per year from the date of disposition.
(2) Every person who directly or indirectly controls
a seller or buyer liable under subsection (1), every partner,
officer, or director of such a seller or buyer, every
person occupying a similar status or performing similar
functions, every employee of such a seller or buyer who
materially aids in the sale or purchase, and every brokerdealer or agent who materially aids in the sale are also
liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent
as the seller or purchaser, unless the nonseller or nonpurchaser who is so liable sustains the burden of proof
that he did not know, and in exercise of reasonalbe care
could not have known, of the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist. There is
contribution as in cases of contract among the several
persons so liable. (Emphasis Added)

-9-
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Section 63-1-3(1) states:
It is unlawful for any person to transact business
in this state as a broker-dealer or agent unless he is
registered under this chapter.

i

An "agent" is defined in Section 61-1-13(2) of the Utah Code as:
Any individual other than a broker-dealer who
represents a broker-dealer or issuer in effecting or
attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities.
"Agent" does not include an individual who represents
an issuer, who receives no commission or other remuneration, directly or indirectly, for effecting or attempting
to effect purchases or sales of securities, and who: (a)
effects transactions in securities exempted by clause (a),
(b), (c), (i) or (j) of subsection 61-1-14(1); (b) effects
transactions exempted by subsection 61-1-14(2); or (c)
effects transactions with existing partners, officers, or
directors of the issuer.
An issuer is defined in Section 61-1-13(11) as:
Any person who issues or proposes to issue any
security, or has outstanding security that it has
issued.
Black's Law Dictionary defines issue as "to put into circulation;
as, the treasury issues notes."
Section 61-1-13(15) defines the meaning of the words "sale",
"sell", "offer" and "offer to sell" and gives examples of those
terms.

Those terms are defined as:

"Sale" or "sell" includes every contract for sale
of, contract to sell, or disposition of, a security or
interest in a security for value.
"Offer" or "offer to sell" includes every attempt
or offer to dispose, or solicitation of an offer to buy,
a security or interest in a security for value. (Emphasis
Added)
C.
Summary

DEFENDANT TOLMAN SOLD THE PLAINTIFF A SECURITY
Both cases decided under Section 410(a) of the Uniform

Securities Act and under Section 12(2) of the Federal Security Act
of

1933 would hold that the Defendant R. C. Tolman "sold" the

Plaintiff a security.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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i

<

The issue in this action is simply whether the trial court
committed reversible error in not advising that the sale of a
security included any "disposition of a security or interest in a
security of value" pursuant to the definition set forth herein,
did Tolman "sell" the Vasilacopulos interest to Walton?
It should be noted that once the Court makes that determination, then judgment should be entered for the Plaintiff and the
matter remanded for a determination of Plaintiff's attorney's fees
pursuant to Section 61-1-22 (1) (a).

There is no question that the

Vasilacopulos interest constituted a security (TR. 418) and that
Tolman did not register as an agent with the Utah State Securities
(TR, 73 and Jury Instruction No. 20) .
The leading case interpreting Section 61-1-22 is S & F
Supply Company v, Hunter 527 P.2d 217 (Utah, 1974)

That case

however, does not address the issues raised in this action.

In

interpreting Section 61-1-22, however, the Utah Supreme Court
noted that Section 61-1-22 "is sufficiently identical with Section
410(a)(2) of the Uniform Securities Act (U.L.A.), and Section 12(2)
of the Federal Securities Act of 1933 that we regard adjudications
on those statutes as helpful to us.

S & F Supply, Supra, 220

footnote 3.
1.

CASES DECIDED UNDER SECTION 410(a) OF THE UNIFORM SECURITIES

ACT, (U.L.A.)
Summary:

numerous cases decided under Section 410(a) of the Uniform

Securities Act have held an agent liable for the "sell" of securities.
-11-
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Numerous cases have been adjudicated in other states under
Section 410 of the Uniform Securities Act (U.L.A.) concerning the
meaning of the term "sell".

The applicable statutes in these

actions define "sell11 in the same manner as does Utah under
Section 61-1-13(15).
In McClellan v. Sundholm 574 P.2d 371 (Wash. 1978) the
Supreme Court of Washington held that a salesman who described
the Defendant company's services including selection of silver,
storage of bars, advice regarding silver market and resale of
silver for purchaser at commission and who advised Plaintiff as to
how payment was to be made, had "offered to sell" and had "sold"
unregistered security to the Plaintiff pursuant to the Washington
State Statute, RCW 21.20.430(1) that made the sale of an unregistered
security illegal.
In McClellan the Washington Supreme Court, indiscussing the
role of the salesman stated:
Since there is no question that the security
was unregistered, the only remaining issue is which
statutory section defines the liability of the respondent.
The trial court found RCW 21.20.430(3) applicable. That
section defines the civil liability of "every person who
directly or indirectly controls a seller or buyer liable
under subsection (1) or (2) . . .." Subsection (1), on
the other hand, defines the liability of "any person, who
offers or sells a security in violation of any provisions
of RCW 21.20.140 . . . "
The trial court apparently believed
Sundholm did not offer or sell a security, but only directly or indirectly controlled a seller. We disagree.
It is quite clear that Sundholm did offer to sell,
and did in fact sell, the security to appellant under the
the definitions of "offer17" and "sell" in RCW 21.20.005(10) .
An "offer" is an "attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy" a security. This accurately decribes respondent's sales approach to appellant. The term
"sell" includes "every contract of sale of, contract to
sell, or disposition of, a security . ." We find the pur-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

chase agreement here was a disposition, and therefore
a sale, of a security,
""""
Respondentf s liability is therefore defined by
RCW 21.20.430(1) applicable to any person "who offers
or sells a security." (Emphasis Added) (Supra at 374)
In Cola v. Terzano 322 A.2d 195 (N. J. Super. 1974) the purchaser of unregistered corporate stock an action against the
salesman who sold her that stock.

That salesman was a manager in

one of the offices of the corporation whose stock was sold.

The

salesman in that action explained the investment to the Plaintiff,
received a check from her which he forwarded to the corporation
and received a commission from that purchase.

In discussing the

salesman's (Terzano) liability for the sale of the unregistered
stock pursuant to a statute that is virtually identical to Utah
Code Section 61-1-22(1) the New Jersey Superior Court stated:
There can be no doubt as to Terzanofs liability
under N. J. S. A. 49-3-70 (a). He was the actual seller
who negotiated with Mrs. Cola, made the representations
in question, and participated in the actual transfer of
funds from Mrs. Cola to I. I. S. (Supra at 200) (Emphasis
Added)
In Gaudina v. Haberman 644 P.2d 159 (Wyo. 1982) the Wyoming
Supreme Court found an unregistered salesman liable for the sale
of unregistered securities under the Wyoming Statutory equivalent
of Section 410(a)(1) of the Uniform Securities Act (U.L.A)
In Gaudina the salesman sold the Plaintiffs a "trust contract"
through Heritage Trust Company.

Those contracts were subsequently

determined to be securities by both the S.E.C. and the Wyoming
Supreme Court.

See Gaudina at 16 4.

In holding the salesman (Gaudina) liable for violating the
applicable Wyoming statutes (Those statutes are identical to Utah
Code Sections 61-1-22 (a) (1), 61-1-3(1) or 61-1-13(2)), the Wyoming
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter-13Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Supreme Court stated:
(10) Gaudina was a person unlawfully acting as
an agent in the sale of uriexempt securities and had
not registered as suc~an agent as required by § 17117.3, W.S. 1957, C.1965, now §17-4-103, W.S.1977,
supra fn.7. This automatically made him civilly
liable under §TT-117Y22(a)(1), W.S.1957, C.1965,
now §17-4-122 (a) (i) , W.SYl:977yfn;/"^ The various
unlawful acts creating civil liability are in the
alternative, as underscored. Gaudina was a person
who sold nonexempt, unregistered securities in violation of §17-117.7f W.S.1957, C.1965, now §17-4-107f
W.S.1977. This also automatically created civil
liability under §17-117.22 (a) (1) f W.S.1957, C.1965,
now §17-4-122 (a) (i) , *W.S.1977.
In Cola v. Terzano, 129 N.J.Super. 47,322 A.2d
195 (1974) it was held that the state's Uniform
Securities Law was intended to protect the uninitiated
and to prevent fraud on the public. All who participated
in the sale of an unregistered security, including
the salesman, have a civil liability. An agent is
is charged with knowledge of the registration requirements and liable for his assistance in the distribution of unregistered securities. The court held that
it is clear that liability attaches "by operation of
law" to the sale by any person of any nonexempt,
unregistered security and gives rise to a cause of
action against all those who participated in the sale.
The only facts necessary are that a security
was sold, that it was unregistered, and that it was
not exempt. Here the security was not only unregistered
but it was also sold by an unregistered agent, which also
creates civil liability without more. (Supra at 168)
(Emphasis added).
2.
Summary:

DECISIONS UNDER SECTION 12(2) OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933.
Federal decisions under Rule 12(2) of the Federal Securi-

ties Act of 1933 support an "expansive" definition of the word
"sell" so as to include the Defendant as a "seller" in the present
action.

j
;

• •

i' =

!
•

i

••

i • • •

.

In summarizing the meaning of the word "sell" under Section
12(2) of Federal Securities Act of 1933 it has been stated:
Liability for violations of either prohibition of
section 12 of the Securities Act attaches to one who
"offers or sells" a security—the action being brought
by the "person purchasing . . . from him."
At its
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most basic level, this language depicts a buyer/seller
relationship not at all unlike traditional contractual
privity. However, section 2(3) of the Act defines
"sale" or "sell" to include "every contract of sale
or disposition of a security or interest in a security,
for value" and the terms "offer to sell," "offer for sale,"
or "offer" to include "every attempt or offer to dispose of,
or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest
in a security, for value."
Careful consideration of
this provision reveals that any person can make an
"attempt to dispose" of a secuirty. Thus, in the case
of a passive actual seller who sells through an active
agent, the latter can also logically be deemed a "person
who sells" within the contemplation oT section 12.
(Emphasis Added).
Rapp, Expanded Liability under Section 12 of the Securities Act;
When is a Seller not a Seller? 27 Case Western Reserve Law Review
445, 450 (1977.

See also Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regu-

lation, 1712.
The foregoing reasoning was adopted in 1940 in Cady v. Murphy
113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir. 1940), cert denied 311 U.S. 705 (1940).

In

Cady v. Murphy the court dealt with the issue of the liability of
Security broker under Section 12(2).

At trial the broker argued

that the section 12 recission remedy only contemplated a restoration of the status quo between those in strict contractual privity.
The trial court rejected that argument stating:
Whether the seller, being a broker, himself owns the
security, or whether he is acting as the agent for the
owner, or for the pruchaser, or for both, is immaterial.
If, in the course of an attempt to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy a security, he makes false
statements under circumstances referred to in Section 12,
the purchaser is given a right of action to recover any
damages he has suffered on account of the false representations.
Cady v. Murphy 30 F. Supp. 466, 469 (D.Me.1939)

The First

Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this analysis stating: "This is
not a strained interpretation of the statute, for a selling agent
-15Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in common parlance would describe himself as a person who sells,
though title passes from his principal, not from him.

(Id at 990)

In discussing agent liability under Section 12(2) it was recently stated in Sommerville v. Major Exploration 576 F.Supp 902
(D.S.D.N.Y. 1983) that:
Nevertheless, although strict privity is not a
prerequisite to liability, Plaintiff must establish
clearly that Defendant is at least a person acting as
the immediate seller's agent, one who is alleged to be
a controlling person of the immediate seller; one who
actively participated in the sale, either as an aider
and abetter or as a co-conspirator, or one under similar circumstances. (Supra at 913) (Emphasis Added).
See also Junker v. Crory 650 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1981)
In Klein v. Computer Devices 591 F. Supp 270, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
it was stated:
This section [12(2)], as compared with common
law recission, provides several advantages to the
buyer. For example section 12(2) permits the buyer
to pierce the privity requirement that normally
prevails in common law recission to the extent of reaching
controlling persons, "sellers" who are agents rather
than principals, and others who participate in the
sale more or less in the criminal aidor and abettor
sense. (Emphasis added)
In Lawler v. Gilliam 569 F.2d 1283 (4th Cir 1978) the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the meaning of the word "sell" in
a factual setting similar to the present action:

That action in-

volved an action to recover the amounts paid to purchase unregistered
securities.

In discussing the meaning of the word "sell"

under

Section 2(3) of the Federal Security Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(3)
the

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
Section 12(1) imposes liability on any person
who "offers or sells" securities in violation of the registration provisions of the Act. These terms are defined
-16Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in §2(3) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3):
The term . . . "sell" shall include every
contract of sale or disposition of a security, for value. The term . . . "offer"
shall include every attempt or offer to
dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to
buy, a security for value.
These definitions include as sellers or offerors all
persons whose actions are a substantial factor in causing
a purchaser to buy a security. It is unnecessary
to show that the offeror or seller owns the security,
for the definitions encompasses any significant
participation in the sale on behalf of the actual owner.
Liability may be imposed on any person who actively
solicits an order, participates in the negotiations,
or arranges the sale. (Supra at 12 8 7 and 128 8) (Citations omitted and Emphasis Added)
The Defendant argues that he did not "sell" the Vasilacopulos
Interest to the Plaintiff.
on the investment.

He argues that Walton "sold" himself

That Walton went to Tolman's office with his

"mind made up" (TR. 275).

In other words the Defendant is arguing

that he is not liable to the Plaintiff because he did not 'persuade"
the Plaintiff to purchase the security (TR. 275). Because the
Plaintiff had his "mind made up" to purchase the Vasilacopulos
security the Defendant argues that he did not "proximately cause"
the sale.

Defendant ignores the fact that he explained the

Vasilacopulos plan to the Plaintiff (TR. 77,78); that he personally
received and receipted the Plaintiff's money, that he received a
10% commission on all Vasilacopulos sales (TR. 4 ) , that the company
that bore his name permitted Vasilacopulos to use his office (TR. 3 ) ;
that the Defendant told the Plaintiff he would receive a 30% per
month return on his investment (TR. 204, TR. 9 ) ; that he personally
opened the office at which Walton invested (TR. 3 ) . That he was
the only salesman in the Centerville office (TR. 6 ) . That he hired
-17-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(TR. 183) and paid (TR. 80, 183) the secretary who receipted
the Plaintiff's second check.

If Tolman didn't sell the Vasila-

copulos security to Walton, who did?
D.

PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

In recent years the State of Utah has received much negative
publicity for the manner in which the Utah Security industry
operates.
The Utah Securities Laws 61-1-1 et. seq. were enacted for the
remedial purpose of restoring investor confidence in the financial
markets.

See generally:

Bennettf Securities Regulation in Utah:

A Recap of History and the New Uniform Actf 8 Utah L. Rev. 216 (1963) .
In light of those purposes the Utah Supreme Court recently declared
that "Securities Laws are remedial in nature and should be broadly
and liberally construed to give effect to their purpose.
Accounting Corp. v. McKinley
the

667 P.2d 15 (Utahf 1983).

Payable
Similarly,

Utah Supreme Court in S & F Supply Company v. Hunter 527 P.2d

217 (Utah 1974) in discussing the purpose of Section 61-1-22 (1) (b) .
The Utah Supreme Court emphasized the remedial nature of that section.
In this action the jury ruled that the Vasilacopulos Interest
constituted a security.

The Defendant stipulated that he did not

register as an agent or in any capacity with the Utah State Securities
Commission. Section 61-1-22(1)(a) and (b) states:
Any person who offers or sells a security in violation of subsection 61-1-3(1) [making it illegal for
one to transact business as an agent unless he has
registered with the Utah State Securities Commission]
. . . is liable to the person buying a security from
him . . .
-18-
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Obviously an unregistered agent can be held liable for selling
a security that does not belong to him.

Otherwise why would the

legislature, by reference, refer to agents in that subsection if
the Defendant's definition of "sell" is adopted an unregistered
agent could sit in his Utah office constantly selling securities
just So long as he didn't sell to anyone who wasn't already "sold11
on the particular security.

Clearly such a result is ridiculous.

The purpose of requiring the registration of agents is to protect
the public.

Such a purpose requires a general registration.

Clearly the statutes purpose can only be accomplished if the
definitions of the word "sell" and "offer to sell" are broad.
Hence, the definitions set forth in Section 61-1-13 (15) (a).
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff contends the failure of the trial court to
instruct the jury as to meaning of the word "sell" pursuant to
Utah Code Section 61-1-13(15) constitutes reversible error.
From the authorities presented and from the facts that Mr.
Tolman admitted at trial, it is clear that the Defendant sold the
Plaintiff the Vasilacopulos interest within the meaning of that
section.

The definition established by Statute would therefore

have been significant benefit to the jury in determining that a
"saleM had occurred.

The failure of the trial court to give the

-19-
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definition adopted by the legislature therefore constituted reversible error.

Dated this 26th day of December, 1985.

RESPECTFUL

KIRK £. LUSTO
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
and Cross-Respondent
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ADDENDUM
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INSTRUCTION NO.

You are instructed that under Utah State Securities Law
that "sell" is defined to include contracts for sale of, contract
to sell or disposition of a securtiy or interest in a security for
value

Source:
1. Utah Code Annotated 61-1-13 (15). (a)
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. I N S T R U C T I O N NO. * Q

You are instructed that in order to find R.C. Tolman

l!

soldlf

any security to Walton you must find that his conduct was the
proximate

cause

of

any

sale,

participation was a substantial

that
factor

is,

his

in bringing

actual Uyy-^sa^Lb transaction/*.

fmcka^

conduct

(kAci ^t[[
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and

about JJkw*

INSTRUCTION NO.

H

The proximate cause of an event is that cause which, in
natural and continuous sequence, produces the event.

It is the

efficient cause—the one that necessarily sets in operation the
factors that accomplish the event.
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INSTRUCTION NO-

C2«X

You are instructed that R.C. Tolman cannot be held legally
responsible

for

Walton's

investments

in question

losses

from

his

purchases

if Tolman merely participated

of

the

in the

purchase and sale transactions as an agent of Vasilacopolus and
Associates without actually

,f

sellingff the investments to Walton as

that term has been defined for you in these instructions.
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